A Model of Residential Sorting with an Endogenous Wealth Distribution by Haavio, Markus & Kauppi, Heikki
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 
 
Discussion Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Model of Residential Sorting with an 
Endogenous Wealth Distribution 
 
 
 
Markus Haavio 
University of Helsinki, RUESG and HECER 
 
and 
 
Heikki Kauppi 
University of Helsinki, RUESG and HECER 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 40 
December 2004 
 
ISSN 1795-0562 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FIN-
00014 University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781,  
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi 
HECER 
Discussion Paper No. 40 
 
A Model of Residential Sorting with an 
Endogenous Wealth Distribution* 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper develops a dynamic multi-region model, where (i) an owner-occupying 
household's current location choice depends on its current wealth, and its current "match" 
(which may reflect the household's demographic characteristics), and (ii) the current 
wealth depend on the household's past fortunes in the housing market, and its past 
location choices. In the long-run equilibrium of the model, the size of capital gains and 
losses, the wealth distribution and residential sorting are all determined endogenously. We 
find that the larger (smaller) the capital gains and losses made in the housing market, the 
more residential sorting there is according to wealth (the match). Also, social welfare 
decreases, if the households face large housing price fluctuations. Finally, we show that 
under rental housing, there is more residential sorting according to the match and less 
sorting according to wealth, than under owner-occupation. 
 
JEL Classification: D31, D52, R13, R21, R23. 
 
Keywords: Residential sorting, Incomplete markets, Owner-occupation, Rental housing. 
 
 
Markus Haavio   Heikki Kauppi 
 
Department of Economics,  Department of Economics 
P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7)  P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7) 
FIN-00014 University of Helsinki  FIN-00014 University of Helsinki 
FINLAND    FINLAND 
 
 
e-mail: markus.haavio@helsinki.fi  e-mail: heikki.kauppi@helsinki.fi 
 
 
 
* We would like to thank Seppo Honkapohja, Erkki Koskela and Sven Rady for useful 
comments on earlier drafts. This paper is a part of the research program of the Research 
Unit on Economic Structures and Growth (RUESG) at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Helsinki. Financial support from the Research Foundation of the Finnish 
Savings Banks Group and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
1 Introduction
A central theme in regional and urban economics has been to examine how households
sort themselves into neighborhoods and communities according to income, wealth and
various socioeconomic characteristics, such family size, the age of the household head, or
education. Typically, the theoretical residential sorting models have been static, and the
income/wealth distribution is taken as exogenous in these models, often with an underly-
ing premise that a households resources reßect its human capital. Examples include the
seminal early paper by Ellickson (1971), as well as more recent important contributions
by Epple and Romer (1989, 1991), Epple and Platt (1998), Epple et al. (1983,1984,1993),
Henderson (1991), Pogodzinski and Sjoquist (1991,1993), Wheaton (1993), and Yinger
(1995); for a recent survey, see e.g. Ross and Yinger (1999).
However, arguably the housing market often plays a major role in shaping the wealth
distribution, as well as in determining an individual households position in the distri-
bution, and in inßuencing how the households wealth evolves over time. For example
in the UK households held over 60% of their total wealth in home equity in the mid
1990s (Banks et al. (2002)). As Þnancial assets tend to be predominately owned by the
wealthiest part of the population, for a typical British household housing was a still
more important component of the portfolio.
Also, housing prices are often highly volatile, opening up the possibility of capital gains
and losses. In the UK, the average inßation adjusted house price was £ 65 000 in 1980, £
100 000 in 1989, £ 64 000 in 1995 and £ 150 000 in 2004, where these prices (as well as all
monetary quantities quoted below) are denoted in 2004 pounds.1 Moreover, in diﬀerent
regions property values tend to rise and fall asynchronously, so that relative regional prices
may vary signiÞcantly over time. In 1981 housing was 1.5 times more expensive in London
than in North-West England (Merseyside and surroundings); in 1987 the ratio of prices
was 2.7, in 1992 1.25 and in 2000 2.3. Relative prices have varied quite a lot even at a
more local level, e.g. between London boroughs. For example in 1995 average housing
prices were 3% lower in Hackley than in Greenwich, but in 2001 Hackley was 20% more
1Source: Nationwide Building Society, http://www.nationwide.co.uk.
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expensive than Greenwich.2 ,3
The capital gains and losses realized in the housing market may be quite large, com-
pared to annual household incomes and savings. Between 1983 and 1988, when London
property values more than doubled in real terms, the price of a typical London home rose
on an average by £ 14 000 each year, a Þgure that corresponded to 72% of the mean
annual disposable household income £ 19 000 in the UK over that period, and exceeded
by the factor of 7.8 average yearly household savings, £ 1800.Between 1989 and 1992,
when the London market lost almost half of its value, the annual capital loss of a typical
homeowner was £ 17 000, or 77% of average disposable household income, and 8.4 times
average household savings.4
As a general rule housing market risks are uninsurable and undiversiÞable. For exam-
ple Shiller (1993, 2003) lists home equity insurance as one of the key Þnancial markets
currently missing. In the UK, real estate futures were traded in the London Futures and
Options Exchange (London Fox) in 1991, from May through October. Trading volume
was low, and the market was closed when it was reported that the exchange had allegedly
attempted to create a the false impression of high trading value by false trades (Shiller
(1993, Ch 1)). Shiller (1993), and Shiller and Weiss (1998) discuss the potential prob-
lems, both economic and psychological, involved in providing hedging against housing
price swings, as well as ways to overcome these problems.5
2Source: Land Registry, http://www.landreg.gov.uk.
3Similar patterns can be found in a number of other countries as well. For example, Shiller (1993, Ch
5) reports sustained dramatic changes in real housing prices at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent U.S. cities. The
average annual rate of change was 9.3% In San Francisco 1976-80, 17,7% in Boston 1983-87, 16,9% in New
York 1983-1987, 10.2% in Washington DC 1986-88, 19.1 in San Francisco 1987-89, 21.2% in Honolulu
1987-90, 22.3% in Seattle 1988-90, -14.6% in Houston 1985-87, -12.2% in Oklahoma City 1986-89, -10.1%
in New York 1988-91, and -13.5% in Boston 1989-91.
4In the North-West, swings in housing prices have been more modest, both in relative and in absolute
terms, but during the two-year period 1988-1989 (when the London market was already entering a
recession) prices rose by 46%, so that the value of an average home increased by £ 14 000 in 1988 and
by £ 11 000 in 1989.
5In the US, there are a few local experiments with home equity insurance. The Oak Park Experiment
has been running since 1977, and the South-West Home Equity Assurance Program was initiated in
1988. Both of these programs are in Chicago, and insure homeowners against price declines caused by
neighborhood change. More recently, the Yale/Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Home Equity
Guarantee Project has developed home equity insurance products, to be initially used in Syracuse, New
York. See Shiller (2003, Ch 8).
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In this paper we develop a dynamic model, with a two-way relation between wealth
and households location choices: (i) A households current location choice depends on
its current wealth (and its current match). (ii) On the other hand, the current wealth
depends on the households past fortunes in the housing market, and its past location
choices. In the long run equilibrium of the model, the size of capital gains and losses, the
distribution of wealth and the pattern of residential sorting are all determined endoge-
nously.
The assumptions of the model concern the structure of preferences (or matches) and
shocks, housing market institutions and Þnancial market incompleteness. The inÞnitely-
lived households, or dynasties, are heterogenous with respect to their match. The match,
which may reßect various demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the household,
indicates how much utility the household derives from residing in diﬀerent locations.
The match may also change over time, if the characteristics of the household (or the
neighborhoods) change.
Swings in relative housing prices derive from regional shocks. These shocks may reßect
the changing quality of local public goods, but on the other hand also the prevailing tastes
and needs of the population, with respect to housing and public goods, tend to evolve,
making certain locations relatively more popular and others less popular. Evidently, there
may also be labor market related reasons.
In the bulk of the paper, we assume that the households are owner-occupiers, so that
the house is both a consumption good and an asset for them. Also, each household must
live in the house that it owns, and as a consequence the decision where to live cannot be
separated from the decision where to invest. There may then be a trade-oﬀ between the
consumption motive and the investment motive of housing. While a currently desirable,
and expensive, location typically oﬀers a household a high utility stream today, buying
a home there may not be such a good investment, since the popularity of the area may
wane in the future, and the (relative) price of the house may fall.
Importantly, Þnancial and insurance markets are assumed to be incomplete, in the
sense that regional housing price movements, as well as well idiosyncratic shocks aﬀecting
the match, are uninsurable. The households can save in terms of a safe asset, and also
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borrow up to a certain limit. If a household faces the borrowing constraint, it cannot
move from a less expensive location to a location with more expensive homes.
Essentially, our results relate the size of capital gains and losses, made in the housing
market, to the form of residential sorting, and to social welfare. We show that small capital
gains and losses tend to be associated with residential sorting according to the match,
while large gains and losses are associated with residential sorting according to wealth.
Social welfare decreases, when the households face larger housing price ßuctuations.
Although the bulk of our analysis focuses on owner-occupation, we also brießy look
at rental housing, and compare the alternative modes of housing tenure. In our frame-
work rental housing essentially corresponds to owner-occupation with deterministic cap-
ital gains and losses, and thus the rental market equilibrium is just a special case of
owner-occupation. Our analysis highlights the following diﬀerence between the modes of
housing tenure: Under rental housing the households face in every period small, deter-
ministic housing costs (rental payments) which depend on their housing location, while
under owner-occupation there are potentially large payments and compensations (capital
losses and gains) which occur only with a certain probability, and aﬀect only a certain
portion of the households in a given period. Under rental housing, households which make
similar location choices, also pay similar housing costs, while under owner-occupation two
households making similar location choices may face starkly diﬀerent realized costs, if,
say only one of the households suﬀers a capital loss. We then show that compared to
owner-occupation, rental housing tends to result in more residential sorting according to
the match, and less sorting according to wealth.
Essentially, the present paper combines two themes, which are typically addressed
separately in the literature: (i) households location choice and residential sorting, and
(ii) the double role of housing as both a consumption good and an investment; housing
as an important component of a households asset portfolio. As discussed above, our
paper diﬀers from (most of the) existing residential sorting models in the sense that in
this literature the income/wealth distribution is taken as given, and thus the existing
studies tend to focus on one side of the two-way relation between housing and wealth.
It is worth noting that while the residential sorting literature pays a lot of attention to
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housing prices, including capitalization eﬀects, typically these prices are determined by
the existing wealth/income distribution, rather than aﬀect it. There is also second key
diﬀerence between the existing literature and our paper. Following the Tiebout (1956)
tradition, many studies in the literature assume that the attractiveness of diﬀerent housing
locations essentially reßect local public policies (taxes, public goods and services), and
typically public policies are also determined endogenously in equilibrium. As the title of a
recent survey (Ross and Yinger (1999)) succinctly puts it, much of this literature is about
sorting and voting. In the present paper, there is no voting: the households matches
with diﬀerent locations, as well as regional shocks, are treated as exogenous.6
Moving to the second branch of related literature, the double role of housing as a con-
sumption good and an asset has been recognized at least since Henderson and Ioannides
(1983) who studied its implications for tenure choice. The basic problem arises from the
fact that a households consumption demand for housing may constrain its investment
choice for housing, or vice versa. A subsequent paper by Henderson and Ioannides (1987)
considered a model with more general institutional characteristics and then analyzed it
empirically. Bruenecker (1997) further studied the interaction between the consumption
demand and the investment demand for housing in a mean-variance portfolio context,
while Flavin and Yamashita (2002) undertook a corresponding econometric analysis. Re-
cent literature has also recognized that owner-occupied housing may serve as a hedge
against the risk that house prices, as well as rental payments, rise in the future (see Cocco
(2000), Davidoﬀ (2003), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002b), and Sinai and Souleles (2003))7.
However, none of these papers has considered the implications of housing market capital
losses and gains for regional allocation of economic households.
To the best of our knowledge, the only study combining both of the themes analyzed
in the present paper is the recent contribution by Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002a), who
study household mobility, volatility of house prices and income distribution.8 Interest-
6Recent empirical studies inspired by the residential sorting models include Epple and Sieg (1999) and
Rhode and Strumpf (2003).
7These papers also analyze the role of the home as a hedging device against adverse shocks in good
prices or labor income. In fact, Henderson and Ioannides (1983) already considered homeownership as a
means to ensure desired housing consumption when future house prices are uncertain.
8Also Rady and Ortalo-Magné (1999, 2001) are somewhat related and provide explanations for why
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ingly, Ortalo-Magné and Rady show that capital gains made in the housing market result
in higher within-neighborhood income variability. This is because some low-income house-
holds, which have bought their home when housing prices were low, Þnd it aﬀordable, and
indeed optimal, to stay in the newly expensive neighborhood. This result echoes our Þnd-
ing that large capital gains and losses in the housing market tend to weaken residential
sorting according to the match. However, the study by Ortalo-Magné and Rady diﬀers
from our paper, since their analysis is partial equilibrium in nature, and focuses entirely
on a single neighborhood. Also, the model has only two periods, and the Þrst period
income/wealth distribution is taken as given. Finally, in terms of tenure choice, Ortalo-
Magné and Rady go further than we do in the present paper, since they let the households
choose between owner-occupation and renting, while we take the mode of housing tenure
(owner-occupation only or renting only) as given.9
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays down the model basics. Section 3
analyzes, how the households choose their housing location, based on their current wealth
and their current match. Section 4 then addresses the other side of the linkage between
wealth and housing markets, and analyzes how the households location choices induce a
stationary wealth distribution. Section 5, which contains our main results, characterizes
equilibrium residential sorting, and social welfare. Section 6 then brießy studies rental
housing, and contrasts residential sorting under the diﬀerent modes of housing tenure.
Finally Section 7 concludes.
2 The basics of the economy
The economy has two of locations, or neighborhoods. Each locations has an equal, Þxed,
stock of identical houses. Each house is occupied by a single household and no one
household is ever homeless. For convenience, assume that the stock of houses and the
mass of households each comprises a continuum of size unity.
house prices tend to be very volatile - an important factor in the present theory.
9Empirically, the dominant mode of housing tenure varies quite signiÞcantly between countries, re-
ßecting e.g. tax treatment, the regulation of rental housing, or the development of the credit market. See
e.g. Chiiuri and Jappelli (2003).
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There are inÞnite discrete time periods indexed by t = 0, 1, .... In each period,one of
the locations is deemed to be desirable while the other one is less desirable. When a
period changes, the relative ranking of the locations is reversed with probability π ∈ (0, 1].
We also consider a small region interpretation of the model, with a continuum of loca-
tions. Then in each period, one half of the locations are desirable while the remaining
locations are less desirable, and when a period changes, a measure π of the locations
is hit by a regional shock. The long-run equilibrium of the model is essentially identical
under both interpretations.
The households are heterogenous in the quality of their match. In every period the
match θ of each household is randomly drawn from a cumulative distribution function
G(θ), on some support [θL, θH ]. The aggregate heterogeneity of households is unchanged
over time so that G is stationary. The actual utility of a household is conditional on the
neighborhood where it resides. We assume that a household receives utility θ, when living
in a desirable location. The utility of anyone household living in a less desirable location is
ω. In particular, we assume that G (ω) < 1
2
, so that more than one half of the households
prefer a desirable location to a less desirable location; if ω < θL, all households would
rather live in a one of the popular locations. Since θ−ω is the utility premium of living in
a desirable location, the parameter ω serves to measure interregional utility diﬀerences.
Also notice that if a region is hit by a shock, the beneÞt stream it oﬀers changes from ω to
θ, or vice versa; thus ω also measures the size of regional shocks. Finally, the households
live forever and discount future utilities by a common factor β ∈ (0, 1).
The sequence of events in any time period is the following. First, a random process
determines which locations are desirable and which are not. Second, each household
observes its current type θ, which is drawn from the distribution G(θ). Finally the house-
holds decide where they want to live. Depending on their choice, they either stay where
they are or they migrate to another location. However, if the household is borrowing con-
strained, it cannot move from an undesirable location to a desirable location. Borrowing
constraints will be discussed in the next section.
Denote the median type by θm. In every period, the aggregate welfare is maximized, if
all households with θ > θm are allocated to the (currently) desirable locations, those with
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θ < θm live in the less desirable locations, and the group (always of measure zero, if G
is continuous) with θ = θm is divided between the locations so that capacity constraints
in housing are not violated. In other words, there is perfect residential sorting according
to the match. If this allocation rule is followed, the expected utility of a representative
household in any period is
W ∗ =
1
2
ω +
1
2
E[θ | θ ≥ θm] (1)
Notice also, that the allocation rule minimizes the within-locations variance of the match,
and maximizes the between-locations variance.
3 The households problem
In the market outcome, the location choice depends on not only the match, but also on
housing prices and wealth. We Þx the housing price in (currently) desirable locations to
1, and normalize the price of housing in (currently) less desirable regions to 0. These
normalizations can be made without loss of generality, since in this model the only choice
available to the households is whether to own a house in a popular neighborhood or in an
unpopular neighborhood; a household cannot sell a house without buying another one.10
Notice also that the normalizations adopted here mean that capital gains and losses are
of size unity.
Markets are incomplete in the sense that capital gains and losses (as well as idiosyn-
cratic shocks aﬀecting the match θ) are uninsurable. The simple incomplete markets
setting we consider here resembles the Huggett (1993) pure credit model and the Bewley
(1983) model with outside money; for a recent text-book treatment, see also Ljunqvist
and Sargent (2004, Ch. 17). In addition to owning a home, the households can transfer
wealth from the current period to the next by holding Þnancial assets. The households
are also allowed to borrow up to a certain limit −b, so that asset holdings can be either
10Only owner-occupation is allowed a this point, and being homeless would entail a large negative
utility stream.
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positive or negative. There are two sorts of Þnancial assets. First there is pure credit,
or inside money, which is available at zero net supply: a household with negative assets
has (at least indirectly) borrowed from other households, with positive holdings. Second,
there is outside money, with Þxed nominal supply M. If the price of money, in terms of
housing (in good locations), is 1/p, the real supply of outside money is M/p. In the sta-
tionary equilibrium, that we analyze in this paper, inside and outside money are perfect
substitutes, and the real interest rate is zero.11
Denote the households Þnancial asset holdings by a and let h be housing: h is equal
to 1, if the household owns a house in a desirable location, and equal to 0, if the house is
in an undesirable location. Then in any given period t, the households budget constraint
reads
at + ht = at−1 + (1− st)ht−1 + st (1− ht−1) (2)
at ≥ −b (3)
where st is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if the location where the household
lives is hit by is a regional shock and 0 otherwise. The wealth of the household in period
t, Þguring on the right-hand side of (2), consists of period t − 1 (positive or negative)
Þnancial asset holdings and housing. If the region where the household lived and owned a
house in period t− 1 has not been hit by a shock, the value of the households house has
remained unaltered (0 or 1); if there has been a shock, the household has made a capital
gain or a loss. The left-hand side of (2) then tells that the household divides its total
resources between period t housing and Þnancial assets. Finally, equation (3) reminds
11In this model, there are no stationary eqiulibria with a positive rate of interest. This is because the
households have no sources of income outside the housing sector. If a household wants to increase its asset
holdings, its best strategy is to live in an unpopular region in every period, and hope for capital gains.
However, with a positive probability, the household does not make (enough) gains in the housing market.
With a positive interest rate, the logic of compound interest implies that a household with negative
initial asset holdings exceeds any Þnite borrowing limit −b with a positive probability at some point in
the future. At the aggregate level, a strictly positive fraction of households with a negative initial position
ends up with asset holdings below −b. Then to avoid breaching the borrowing limit, all households should
have non-negative asset positions. This is however impossible, since there are no outside sources of credit,
and the aggregate supply of inside money is zero (obviously the degerate allocation, where all households
have zero assets, is feasible).
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that asset holdings are not allowed to fall below the debt limit −b.
In any given period, a households total wealth (z) consists of Þnancial assets and
housing,
zt = at + ht (4)
Then from (2) we get a law of motion for zt,
zt+1 = zt + st+1 (1− 2ht) , (5)
which immediately reveals that a households wealth changes if and only if the neighbor-
hood where it resides is hit by a shock, and housing prices rise or fall. Also, plugging (4)
into (3) shows, how the borrowing constraint limits location choices at low wealth levels:
ht = 0 if zt < 1− b (6)
Looking at equations (5) and (6), two observations can be made: (i) A households
wealth always changes in steps of size unity. (ii) All households with wealth z = ε − b,
where ε ∈ [0, 1) are borrowing constrained. Likewise all households with wealth z =
n+ ε− b, where n ∈ {0, 1, 2...}, are n capital losses away from the borrowing constraint.
DeÞnition 1 A household has n units of disposable wealth, if z = n + ε − b, where
n ∈ {0, 1, 2...} and ε ∈ [0, 1).
In the analysis, disposable wealth n will serve as the state variable. It evolves according
to the law of motion
nt+1 = nt + st+1 (1− 2ht) (7)
Without loss of generality, we assume that ε = 0 for all households, so that the households
do not carry any superßuous assets.12 If a household has no disposable wealth, it is
12Allowing for ε > 0 would aﬀect the nominal, or monetary, price of housing p, but otherwise the
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borrowing constrained and can only live in an unpopular area:
ht = 0 if nt = 0 (8)
Consider the optimization problem of any one household. In every period it chooses
its location so as to maximize the expected discounted utility stream
Eθ
∞X
t=0
βt [htθ + (1− ht)ω] ,
subject to (7) and (8). The problem can be conveniently presented in a recursive form.
Let V (n) denote the optimal value of the problem for a household which has n units of
disposable wealth. V (n) satisÞes the Bellman equations
V (n) = Eθ [max {θ + β [(1− π)V (n) + πV (n− 1)] ,
β [ω + (1− π)V (n) + πV (n+ 1)]}] for n ≥ 1 (9)
and
V (0) = ω + β [(1− π)V (0) + πV (1)] (10)
Note that the value function V (n) is evaluated after the regional shock has been realized
but before the type θ has been revealed to the household. The maximization problem then
deÞnes the optimal choice of location that takes place when the value of θ becomes known.
Inside the maximum operator, the Þrst expression is the value of living in a desirable
neighborhood, while the second expression is the value of choosing a less desirable location.
If the households optimal decision is to live in a good neighborhood, it can immediately
eat whatever value θ realized. its prospects for the next period are discounted by β
and are given in the square brackets in the Þrst argument of the maximization problem.
There is a probability 1 − π that the location will be popular also tomorrow so that it
long-run equilibrium of the model would remain intact.
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Figure 1: The θ∗n-curve when θ is uniformly distributed on [1, 2], ω = 0, β = .95, and
π = .3.
will be facing the same value function as today, while with probability π the location
loses its appeal and the household suﬀers a capital loss. If the household chooses an
undesirable neighborhood, its utility in the current period is ω. With probability (1− π)
its neighborhood is out of vogue also in the next period, while with probability π its status
improves, and the household makes a capital gain.
The location choice reßects a tension between the consumption and the investment
aspect of housing. While a popular region typically oﬀers a household a higher utility
stream today, currently less popular and less expensive areas are more attractive from the
investment point of view. The investment motive is forward-looking and arises from the
households need to have enough wealth also in future periods. Indeed, the maximization
problem involves a trade-oﬀ between present beneÞts and future options. The household
wants to avoid the situation where its location choices are limited by the borrowing
constraint. Choosing a desirable location when the match is not so good entails the
possibility that this option may not be available in the future when the match is better.
12
In each wealth class n ≥ 1 there is then a critical quality of match
θ∗n = ω + πβ[V (n+ 1)− V (n− 1)] (11)
that equates the two arguments in the maximization operator in (9). households with
θ > θ∗n choose a desirable neighborhood, while those with θ < θ
∗
n go to a currently less
desirable neighborhood in the hope of making capital gains in the housing market. Finally,
households with θ = θ∗n are indiﬀerent between the two alternatives; if the distribution
G(θ) is continuous, this group is always of measure zero. Figure 1 shows θ∗n with diﬀerent
values of n when the earnings are uniformly distributed on [1, 2], ω = 0, β = .95, and
π = .3. Clearly, θ∗n decreases with n. This is a general property of θ
∗
n, and it stems from
the fact that the value function is concave. (Concavity is proved in the appendix.) Also,
this Þnding has a natural interpretation. If a household is wealthy, additional assets are
of less value. To put it diﬀerently, the more assets the household has, the more distant is
the prospect of being borrowing constrained at some point in the future.
Essentially, Figure 1 illustrates the following Þnding:
Proposition 1 Residential sorting takes place both according to the match and according
to wealth. Wealthy households and households with a good match tend to choose a popular
neighborhood, while less wealthy households and households with a poorer match live in
the less desirable locations.
This result parallels the Þndings in Epple and Platts (1998) model with two-dimensional
heterogeneity, where both income and tastes aﬀect equilibrium stratiÞcation of the pop-
ulation. Compared to Epple and Platt (1998), a key diﬀerence here is that heterogeneity
in terms of wealth will be derived endogenously, in the next section.
Next we analyze how the size and the frequency of regional shocks aﬀect location
choices.
The parameter ω provides a measure of how diﬀerent the desirable and the undesirable
locations are from each other. It also gauges the size of regional shocks: if a location
is hit by a shock, the utility stream it oﬀers to households changes from ω to θ, or vice
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versa. An increase in regional diﬀerences, so that ω decreases, strengthens the households
incentives to choose a desirable location in the current period (consumption motive). On
the other hand, it also reinforces the incentives to accumulate assets (investment motive),
since a household stands to loose more if it faces the borrowing constraint at some point
in the future. However, since the future losses are discounted, and only occur with a
certain probability, the eﬀect on current consumption demand dominates. The larger the
regional diﬀerences, and the regional shocks, the more likely it is, ex ante (i.e. before
the realization of the match), that a household with a given level of disposable wealth n
chooses a currently desirable location. The following lemma states these Þndings more
formally:
Lemma 1 The θ∗n-schedule shifts up (down) when ω increases (decreases). That is, for
all n ≥ 1, dθ∗n
dω
> 0.
Proof See the appendix.
The parameter π measures the frequency of regional shocks. As the parameter π
does not aﬀect the utility streams, θ and ω, available in diﬀerent location, an increase in
π leaves the consumption demand of housing unaltered; however the investment motive
becomes stronger, encouraging the households to choose a currently less popular and
less expensive location. This is because households living in a popular neighborhood are
increasingly likely to suﬀer capital losses, while capital gains are an increasingly likely
prospect if the household buys a property in a currently less desirable area. Viewing the
households dilemma from a somewhat diﬀerent angle, when transitions up and down the
wealth ladder take place with a higher probability, the prospect of facing the borrowing
constraint at some point in the future becomes an increasingly powerful deterrent. Then
in any unconstrained wealth class, a households needs a better match before it chooses to
live in a currently popular neighborhood.
Lemma 2 The θ∗n-schedule shifts up (down) as π increases (decreases). That is, for all
n ≥ 1, dθ∗n
dπ
> 0.
Proof See the appendix.
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4 Stationary wealth distribution
The previous section showed, how a household chooses its location based on its current
wealth and its current match. On the other hand, a households current wealth depends on
its past fortunes in the housing market, and its past location choices. Then the long-run
wealth distribution arises as a result of households moving policies.
Denote by fn the size of wealth class n, and let
f bn = G (θ
∗
n) fn, f
g
n = (1−G (θ∗n)) fn
be the frequency of households with disposable wealth n who live in bad (or undesirable)
locations and good (or desirable) locations, respectively. Notice also that
f bn
fgn
=
G(θ∗n)
1−G(θ∗n)
≡ γn (12)
The odds ratio γn decreases with n as wealthy households are more likely to choose a
good neighborhood.
Consider Þrst the two-region interpretation of the model. If there is no regional shock
in a given period (s = 0), the wealth distribution remains unaltered. If there is a shock
(s = 1) , all fn households who were previously in wealth class n either climb one step up
or fall one step down, depending on their house location. They are replaced by f bn−1 class
n−1 households who have made a capital gain, and f gn+1 class n+1 households who have
suﬀered a capital loss. The distribution is stationary if and only if
fn = (1− s) fn + s
¡
f bn−1 + f
g
n+1
¢
(13)
for all n. Next, if there is a continuum of atomistic regions, in every period, the fraction
π of the locations is hit by a regional shock, and the wealth distribution is stationary if
and only if
fn = (1− π) fn + π
¡
f bn−1 + f
g
n+1
¢
(14)
15
for all n. It is easy to see that the equations (13) and (14) both boil down to the same
stationarity condition
fn ≡ f bn + f gn = f bn−1 + fgn+1 (15)
As a consequence, both model variants have the same long-run wealth distribution, and
the same long-run equilibrium.
There are no wealth classes below the borrowing constrained class 0, and at wealth level
0 the borrowing constrained households can only choose an unpopular location. Observing
that f−1 = f
g
0 = 0, equation (15) implies f0 ≡ f b0 = f g1 ; that is, the group of households
with minimum Þnancial asset holdings, but a house in a good location (f g1 ) must be of
the same size as the borrowing constrained group (f b0). But then f1 ≡ f b1 + f g1 = f b0 + f g2
implies f b1 = f
g
2 , and iterating forward leaves us with the sequence of equations
f bn = f
g
n+1 (16)
for all n ≥ 0. In words, each two groups with the same Þnancial asset holdings, but
diﬀerent housing location, must be of equal size. Summing over all wealth classes yieldsP
n f
b
n =
P
n f
g
n and given that the aggregate mass of households is unity
P
n fn =P
n
¡
f bn + f
g
n
¢
= 1, it follows that
X
n
f in =
1
2
i ∈ {b, g} (17)
But these equations indicate that the demand for housing, on the left-hand side, is equal
to the supply of housing
¡
1
2
¢
, in both location types.
To obtain an explicit characterization of the wealth distribution, we next combine (12)
and (16). What we get is a simple Þrst order diﬀerence equation for both f gn and f
b
n.
f gn+1 = γnf
g
n and f
b
n+1 = γn+1f
b
n (18)
and the frequency of any node can be linked to the size of the liquidity constrained group
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Figure 2: Wealth distributions with diﬀerent values of π when θ is uniformly distributed
on [1, 2] and β = .95
f0
f bn = f
g
n+1 = f0
nY
i=0
γi n ≥ 0
where γ0 ≡ 1. These equations, combined with the housing market equilibrium (17) lead
to the formulae
fgn+1 = f
b
n =
Qn
i=0 γiPn−1
k=0
Qk
i=1 γi
for n = 0, ..., n− 1
which, together with the equalities fn = f bn + f
g
n, determine the stationary distribution.
Figure 2 shows the stationary wealth distribution for three diﬀerent values of π, when
θ is uniformly distributed on [1, 2] and β = .95. The distributions are single-peaked, with
wealth classes in the middle typically having more mass than those on the tails. The
single-peakedness is a general property, and follows from the fact that γn is decreasing in
n. Intuitively, households with fewer assets are likely to choose the less popular location
and make capital gains. For wealthy households, capital losses are more probable. Thus
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transitions in the wealth distribution tend to happen towards the middle.
We also notice that increasing π from .1 Þrst to .3 and then to 1 shifts the distribution
to the right, towards higher wealth classes. When capital gains and losses become more
probable, the households adopt increasingly cautious strategies, and are more likely to
choose the less desirable location, in the hope of capital gains. As a result a larger
proportion of the households reach higher wealth levels. Notice also that with bigger
values of π, there is less mass on the tails of the distribution. This observation is worth
mentioning since households in the extreme wealth classes are unwilling or unable to move
in response to a changing match.
These Þndings can be restated more precisely, if we deÞne the cumulative distribution
function
F (n;ω, π) =
nX
i=0
fi.
Lemma 3 When ω or π increases, the wealth distribution shifts to the right, in the sense
of Þrst-order stochastic dominance. That is ∂F (n;ω,π)
∂ω
≤ 0 and∂F (n;ω,π)
∂π
≤ 0. In particular,
the size of the borrowing constrained group (f0) decreases.
Proof By Lemmas 1 and 2, the θ∗n-schedule shifts up when ω or π grows. This then
increases the odds ratio γn, and equations (18) imply that the ratio f
i
n+1/f
i
n, i ∈ {b, g}
goes up. But then it follows immediately that for each n, ∂F (n;ω,π)
∂ω
≤ 0 and ∂F (n;ω,π)
∂π
≤ 0.
The aggregate long-run equilibrium of the economy is deÞned by the stationary wealth
distribution, combined with the households location choices. In this section we have
essentially studied how location choices induce the distribution. It is however also useful
to move the other way round. The wealth distribution, and especially Lemma 3, allows
us to further characterize the environment that the households face, assess how wealthy
they are, and to reinterpret the location choices they make.
First, the average wealth level in the economy, E [n], can be used as a yardstick,
against which the size of capital gains and losses, normalized to 1, can be measured.
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Remark 1 The larger, or the less frequent (and more unexpected), the regional shocks,
the larger the capital gains and losses are, compared to average household wealth E [n] .
Proof Since the size of capital gains and losses is normalized to 1, their relative
magnitude, proportioned to the average wealth in the economy, is 1/E [n]. Lemma 3
implies that E [n] increases together with π and ω.
The next remark points out how the households wealth can be assessed, and reinter-
prets Lemmas 1 and 2, in revealing a relation between a households relative position in
the wealth distribution, and its location choice.
Remark 2 Consider a household with disposable wealth n. The smaller (larger) the val-
ues of ω and π, (i) the wealthier (poorer) the household is, relative to other households and
(ii) the more likely the household is to choose a currently desirable (undesirable) location.
Proof The result follows from Lemmas 1-3.
Finally, we characterize the asset market equilibrium. The market clearing condition
is
E [a] =
M
p
(19)
where the left-hand side of (19) is the aggregate demand for assets, and the right hand
side is the net supply, equal to real outside money. Using (4) and DeÞnition 1, (19) can
be rewritten as
E [n] =
1
2
+ b+
M
p
(20)
This equation states that the average, and aggregate, disposable wealth E [n] is equal to
the value of the housing stock 1
2
, inside money, captured by the borrowing limit b, and
outside money M
p
. In equilibrium, the value of outside money in terms of housing, 1/p, or
its reciprocal the monetary value of housing p, which also measures the monetary value
of capital gains and losses, adjusts to guarantee market clearing. In light of Lemma 3,
it is evident that p increases when regional shocks become larger, or less frequent. Also
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notice that since real net supply of outside money M
p
cannot be negative, the equation
(20) implies a maximum allowed value for the borrowing limit
b ≤ bmax ≡ E [n]− 1
2
(21)
If this condition is not met, the model does not have a stationary equilibrium. If the
borrowing limit is set in monetary terms, so that b = B/p, where the monetary borrowing
limit B is exogenously given, the adjustment of the price level p guarantees that the
real-valued borrowing limit b is never too lax, and the condition (21) always holds. In
particular, with a monetary borrowing limit, the monetary value of housing is
p =
B +M
E [n]− 1
2
5 Residential sorting
This section studies the aggregate behavior of the economy. We begin by analyzing social
welfare. Addressing this normative issue will eventually also allow us to characterize
residential sorting, since in the present model high social welfare is essentially associated
with location choices based on the match, rather than wealth.
Consider a household with n units of disposable wealth. In any period it chooses
the desirable neighborhood if its match θ ≥ θ∗n and otherwise goes to the less desirable
neighborhood. Given this strategy, the expected utility (before the draw of θ) of the
household, or alternatively the average realized utility of all households in class n, is
un = Pr(θ ≤ θ∗n)ω + Pr(θ ≥ θ∗n)E[θ | θ ≥ θ∗n] = G (θ∗n)ω + vn
where vn ≡
R θH
θ∗n
θdG(θ). Aggregation then involves summing over all wealth classes.
Notice that
P
n fnG (θ
∗
n) =
P
n f
b
n =
1
2
(by the housing market equilibrium (17)), and
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overall welfare in any given period is
fW = nX
n=0
fnun =
1
2
ω +W
where
W =
nX
n=0
fnvn ≡ E [θ | h = 1]
is a measure of net welfare, reßecting the regional allocation of households. Notice that
if the parameter ω, which captures the size of regional diﬀerences and regional shocks,
changes, this aﬀects net welfare W only as long as the location policies followed by the
households change. This measure, W ≡ E [θ | h = 1] , is the key when we study sorting
according to the match: if the average match in the desirable locations E [θ | h = 1]
improves, the regions or neighborhoods become increasingly stratiÞed along the match
dimension.
An alternative way to approach social welfare is to imagine that a new households
enters the economy. The entrant is assigned to wealth class n with probability fn, and
its expected intertemporal prospects are then given by the value function V (n). The
households prospects ex ante, i.e. before it knows its wealth, are
W =
nX
n=0
fnV (n) (22)
We can also deÞne a value function based measure of net welfare
cW = W − 1
2
ω
1− β
The appendix shows that, up to a constant multiplier, the per period utility and value
21
function based measures of (net) welfare are equivalent:
fW = (1− β)W (23)
W = (1− β)cW (24)
These equalities will be needed in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The smaller, or the more frequent, the regional shocks, the higher is the
level of social (net) welfare.
Proof It suﬃces to show that the results hold for the measure of net welfare. The
results concerning gross welfare then follow immediately.
The required derivations are more succinct and clearer if some vector notation is
introduced. Let V, v, and f be column vectors capturing the value function, the expected
utility per period, and the stationary wealth distribution, respectively. As proving the
result with respect to π and ω, involves the same steps, we also introduce a generic
parameter ρ, where ρ ∈ {π,ω}.
Now totally diﬀerentiating (22) yields
dcW
dρ
= df
0
dρ
³
V − ω
1−β
´
+ f 0 d
dρ
³
V − ω
1−β
´
= df
0
dρ
V + f 0 ∂
∂ρ
³
V − ω
1−β
´
,
(25)
where the second equality is obtained by using (i) the fact that (as f 0ω = ω) df
0
dρ
ω = 0 and
(ii) the envelope theorem: as the threshold θ∗n is chosen optimally in every wealth class
n ≥ 1, the indirect eﬀect on the value function can be ignored. Next we use the identity
(24) to show that also the weighted sum of direct eﬀects f 0 ∂
∂ρ
³
V − ω
1−β
´
vanishes:
f 0
∂
∂ρ
µ
V − ω
1− β
¶
=
∂
∂ρ
·
f 0
µ
V − ω
1− β
¶¸
= (1− β)−1∂(f
0v)
∂ρ
= 0
The Þrst equality exploits the fact that the stationary distribution f depends on the
parameters π,ω only indirectly, through the choice of policy and the second equality uses
(24). The Þnal equality follows from the observation that expected net utility in a given
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period (v) does not depend directly on ρ.
Thus only the eﬀect through the stationary wealth distribution remains. By Lemma
3 we know that the distribution shifts to the right, towards higher wealth classes, when
π or ω increases. As the value function V is increasing in n, this shift in the stationary
distribution translates into higher aggregate net welfare cW :
dcW
dρ
=
df 0
dρ
V ≥ 0
Notice that this also implies that the average match in the desirable location improves
dE [θ | h = 1]
dρ
> 0
The following remark may help in understanding what the proposition means in more
concrete terms.
Remark 3 Social welfare is higher, when capital gains and losses made in the housing
market are small, compared to the average wealth in the economy, than when these gains
and losses are large.
Proof This Þnding follows by combining Proposition 2 and Remark 1.
We try to interpret these results with the help of the (preliminary) Þndings and remarks
made earlier in this paper. In what follows we will focus on the case with large and/or
infrequent regional shocks, resulting in low welfare. The opposite situation, with small
and/or frequent shocks, and high welfare, can be interpreted simply by inverting the
arguments.
The ineﬃciencies arising when regional shocks are large or infrequent can be traced
back to the households problem, studied in Section 3. When ω and π are small, Lemmas 1
and 2 indicate that when households choose their location, the forward-looking investment
motive tends to be weak, compared to the consumption motive. This is already a sign that
the location choices made in the market equilibrium may substantially deviate from the
socially optimal rule, since the investment motive provides the households the incentives
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not to choose a desirable location, when the match is not so good. Next, the weakness
of the investment motive, and the resulting location choices, means that typically the
households do not accumulate lots of Þnancial assets; see Lemma 3. This then has its
implications on the wealth distribution; in particular, the borrowing constrained group
tends to be rather large. This is a further sign of ineﬃciency, as borrowing constrained
households can only live in undesirable, and less expensive, neighborhoods; they cannot
choose their location based on the current match.
Proposition 2 also allow us to characterize how heterogeneity within and between
locations, in terms of the match, changes, when π or ω increases.
Proposition 3 The smaller, or the more frequent the regional shocks are, (i) the more
distinct the locations are from each other in terms of the match and (ii) the less hetero-
geneity in terms of the match there is within locations.
Proof (i) By Proposition 2, the average match in the desirable location E [θ | h = 1]
improves when π or ω increases. As the average match in the whole population, E [θ] ≡ θ,
is constant, the expected value of θ in the undesirable location E [θ | h = 0]must decrease.
But then it follows immediately that the between-groups variance
V ar (E [θ | h]) = 1
2
¡
E [θ | h = 0]− θ¢2 + 1
2
¡
E [θ | h = 1]− θ¢2
increases.
(ii) The overall variance of the match in the economy V ar (θ) ≡ σ2 can be de-
composed into within-groups variance and between-groups variance, E [V ar (θ | h)] +
V ar (E [θ | h]) = σ2. As the economy-wide variance σ2 is constant, the within-groups com-
ponentE [V ar (θ | h)] necessarily decreases, if the between-groups component V ar (E [θ | h])
increases.
When the Proposition 2 was interpreted, it became apparent that whenever social
welfare is low, and there is little residential sorting according to the match, the investment
motive plays a minor role in location choice and the households incentives to accumulate
Þnancial assets are weak. Then capital gains and losses, as well as housing price diﬀerences
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between desirable and undesirable locations tend to be large, compared to average wealth
in the economy. Given this background, it should hardly be surprising that, when we
next turn to residential sorting along the wealth dimension, we will see a mirror image,
compared to sorting according to the match.
The households posses both housing wealth and Þnancial capital. Then, in principle
the neighborhoods could diﬀer in terms of both wealth categories. However, equations (16)
indicate that in the long-run equilibrium the distribution of Þnancial assets is identical in
both types of location. Then given that E [a | h = 1] = E [a | h = 0], interregional wealth
diﬀerences derive entirely from diﬀerent housing values
E [n | h = 1]−E [n | h = 0] = E [h | h = 1]− E [h | h = 0] = 1
and proportioning regional wealth diﬀerences to the average wealth gives
E [n | h = 1]− E [n | h = 0]
E [n]
= 1/E [n] (26)
Proposition 4 The larger, or the more infrequent / persistent, the regional shocks, the
more the locations diﬀer from each other in terms of wealth.
Proof The result follows from equation (26) and Lemma 3.
Finally, combining Propositions 3 and 4, and Remark 1 allows us to characterize the
relation between the size of capital gains and losses made in the housing market, and the
form of residential sorting.
Proposition 5 Small capital gains and losses in the housing market are associated with
residential sorting according to the match. Large capital gains and losses are associated
with residential sorting according to wealth.
Residential sorting according to the match and according to wealth tend to produce
diﬀerent neighborhoods and regions. Remember that a households match may be inter-
preted as reßecting certain socioeconomic characteristics of the household, or the current
life situation of its members. Thus if two households have a similar current match, one
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might think that the households resemble each other in terms of, say, size, or that the
members of the two households are undergoing a similar episode of life. By contrast, (in
this model) a households current wealth essentially just indicates whether the household
has been lucky or unlucky in the housing market. Two households with the same wealth
level may be very diﬀerent in other respects. Proposition 5 then indicates that when
capital gains and losses made in the housing market are small, neighborhoods or regions
tend to be internally homogenous along the relevant dimension. Large capital gains
and losses muddle this picture: within the same region or neighborhood there may reside
households, which have little in common, apart from the value of their home.
6 Rental housing
The model also allows us to study rental housing, and to contrast the rental arrangement
to owner-occupation.
Assume that the whole housing stock is managed by real estate companies, owned by
the households. We normalize the price system, so that the per period rent is 2 in desirable
locations and 0 in less desirable locations. The companies collect the rental payments and
distribute them back to the households, so that in each period each household receives a
revenue stream 1. Then in each period all households residing in a desirable location pay
1 unit more than they earn, while those residing in a less desirable location earn one unit
more than they pay. Then the disposable wealth of a household evolves according to the
law of motion
nt+1 = nt + (1− 2ht) (27)
It is easy to notice that (27) is a special case of the wealth dynamics under owner-
occupation (7): (27) corresponds to the situation, where π = 1, and st = 1 in every
period. Rental payments and revenues are equivalent to capital losses and gains which
occur with certainty. More generally, the incentives that the renters face when choosing
their housing location correspond to the incentives that owner-occupiers face, if regional
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shocks take place with probability one in every period. As a consequence, also the pat-
tern of residential sorting is equivalent to that in an owner-occupation economy, with
deterministic shocks. Then we can state the following result.
Proposition 6 Under rental housing, there is more residential sorting according to the
match, and less sorting according to wealth, than under owner-occupation.
Proof Rental housing corresponds to owner-occupation in the special case, with π = 1.
Then the result follows from Propositions 3 and 4.
In the present model, location choices which are based on the match, rather than
wealth, result in high social welfare. Thus Proposition 5 suggests, that rental hous-
ing might be superior to owner-occupation, in terms aggregate utility. However, it is
well-known that, compared to owner-occupation, rental relationships may involve various
agency problems, which can then lower the quality of housing services. To provide a
simple welfare comparison between the modes of housing tenure, we model these welfare
costs by assuming that under rental housing, a households per period utility is θ − α
in a desirable location and ω − α in a less desirable location, where α ≥ 0. Notice that
the size of agency costs is the same in all locations. Then while agency costs lower the
households well-being, they do not aﬀect location choices.
It is easy to see that per period social (net) welfare under rental housing (WR) is given
by
WR =Wπ=1 − α
where Wπ=1 is the measure of net social welfare under owner-occupation, when π = 1.
Proposition 7 Social welfare tends to be higher (lower) under rental housing than under
owner-occupation, when regional shocks are infrequent (frequent), and agency costs in
rental housing are small (large).
Proof According to Proposition 2, social welfare under owner-occupation increases
when regional shocks become more frequent, and π increases . Under rental housing, the
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households do not face capital gains and losses and their incentives do not depend on the
frequency of the regional shocks. Thus the true value of π does not aﬀect social welfare
under rental housing.
7 Conclusions
In typical models of residential sorting, wealth aﬀects a households choice of location and
housing quality, but there is no opposite connection from housing and location choices
to wealth. However, empirical evidence indicates that the housing market often plays a
major role in shaping the wealth distribution, in determining an individual households
position in the distribution, and in inßuencing how the households wealth evolves over
time.
In this paper, we developed a dynamic multi-region model, where (i) a households
current location choice depends on its current wealth, and its current match (where the
match may reßect various demographic or socioeconomic characteristics of the household),
and (ii) the current wealth depends on the households past fortunes in the housing
market, and its past location choices. In the long-run equilibrium of the model, the
size of capital gains and losses, the wealth distribution and residential sorting are all
determined endogenously.
Essentially, our results relate the size of capital gains and losses, made in the housing
market, to the form of residential sorting, and to social welfare. We show that small capital
gains and losses tend to be associated with residential sorting according to the match,
while large gains and losses are associated with residential sorting according to wealth.
Social welfare decreases, when the households face larger housing price ßuctuations. In
addition, we compare owner-occupation and rental housing. Under rental housing there
is more residential sorting according to the match, and less sorting according to wealth,
than under owner-occupation.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemmas 1 and 2
In this appendix we show that the value function is concave. We also demonstrate that
the θ∗n-schedule shifts up when π or ω increases. To establish these result, Þrst notice that
a households strategy, telling how it chooses its location in each wealth class, essentially
involves Þnding an optimal threshold value θ∗n for each n ≥ 1. As there is a one-to-
one mapping between the threshold θ∗n, and the corresponding value of the cumulative
distribution function G (θ∗n) , also xn ≡ G (θ∗n) can be equivalently used as the choice
variable. Given this reinterpretation of the problem, and using matrix notation, the
Bellman equations (9) can be reexpressed in the following form
V = max
{xn}
u+ β [(1− π) I + πP ]V (28)
for n ≥ 1 (and x0 = 1) where V is the value function, stacked as a column vector, u is
the column vector of expected immediate utility, with elements
un (xn) ≡ xnω +
Z 1
xn
G−1 (x) dx
and P is a transition matrix, with elements
Pi,j =

1− xi if j = i− 1
xi if j = i+ 1
0 otherwise
i, j ∈ {0, ..., n}
Notice that du
2
n
dx2n
= − 1
G0(θ∗n)
< 0. Thus (28) deÞnes a maximization problem with a concave
objective function and linear constraints. As a consequence the value function V (n) is
concave.
Also the Þrst order conditions can be rephrased using matrix notation
θ∗ = ω1+ πβDV (29)
29
where θ∗ = (θ∗1, ..., θ
∗
n)
0 is the vector of threshold values13, 1 = (1, ..., 1)0 and D is the
diﬀerence matrix, with elements
Di,j =

1 if j = i+ 1
−1 if j = i− 1
0 otherwise
i ∈ {1, ..., n}, j ∈ {0, ..., n}
Next we want to study what happens to optimal location choices, when the parameters
π and ω change. Diﬀerentiating the right hand side of (29) with respect to π yields
d (πβDV )
dπ
= βD
µ
V + π
dV
dπ
¶
(30)
Then diﬀerentiating the Bellman equation (28) with respect to π, and using the envelope
theorem, yields
dV
dπ
=
∂V
∂π
=
δ
π
(I − δP )−1(P − I)V (31)
where δ ≡ πβ
1−β(1−π) , δ ∈ [0, 1) is the uncertainty adjusted discount rate. Finally we plug
(31) into (30):
d (πβDV )
dπ
= β(1− δ)D(I − δP )−1V > 0 (32)
In signing the expression, the following facts have been used: (i) The value function V
is increasing n. (ii) Then also (I − δP )−1V = P∞i=0(δP )iV is increasing in n. To see
this, notice that (1− δP )−1V is the value of a Markov process, with transition matrix P
and immediate gain in state n given by V (n). As this immediate gain increases with n,
the expected present value of the program also increases. (iii) When we premultiply an
increasing vector by the diﬀerence matrix D, the result is positive.
13Notice that θ∗0 cannot be freely chosen, as the agents are liquidity constrained.
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Now we can get the desired result:
dθ∗
dπ
= β(1− δ)D(I − δP )−1V > 0
In words, when the probability of capital gains and losses increases, the θ∗n -schedule shifts
upwards.
Next we turn to the parameter ω. The derivative of the right hand side of (29) with
respect to ω is
1+ πβD
dV
dω
and diﬀerentiating the Bellman equation (28) with respect to ω yields
dV
dω
=
δ
πβ
(I − δP )−1 x
where x ≡ (x0, ..., xn) . Then
dθ∗
dω
= 1+ πβD
dV
db
= 1+ δD (I − δP )−1 x
As x is a decreasing sequence, the elements of the vector δD (I − δP )−1 x are negative.
Next we want to establish that these terms are smaller than one in absolute value. To do
so, we adopt the notation k ≡ δD (I − δP )−1 x. The elements of the vector k satisfy the
recursive equations
k (n) = xn+1 − xn−1 + δ [xn+1k (n+ 1) + (1− xn−1) k (n− 1)] (33)
Assume that
k (m) = min
n
k
31
Then in particular, k (m+ 1) , k (m− 1) ≥ k (m) , and it is immediately clear that
k (m) ≥ xm+1 − xm−1 + δ [xm+1k (m) + (1− xm−1) k (m)]
or
k (m) ≥ ek ≡ ∆x
1− δ (1 +∆x)
where ∆x ≡ xm+1−xm−1. As x is a non-increasing sequence, ∆x can take values over the
interval [−1, 0]. Diﬀerentiating ek with respect to ∆x yields dek
d∆x
= 1−δ
(1−δ(1+∆x))2 > 0,andek ≥ −1. Thus minn k ≥ ek ≥ −1, and
dθ∗
dω
= 1+ δD (I − δP )−1 x ≥ (1− δ)1 > 0
The derivation of equations (23) and (24)
In this appendix we derive the equations (23) and (24).
First, with a given moving policy θ∗, the Bellman equations (28) can be reexpressed
using matrix algebra, and the notation introduced in the previous section:
V = (1− δ) u
1− β + δPV (34)
Now solving (34) for u we get
u =
1− β
1− δ (I − δP )V (35)
On the other hand the stationary distribution f can be solved from the equation
f 0(I − P ) = 0⇔ (I − P 0)f = 0 (36)
which determines f as the eigenvector associated to the unit eigenvalue of P 0. With these
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preliminaries, we can now derive the equations (24):
fW = f 0u = f 01− β
1− δ (I − δP )V =
1− β
1− δ f
0(I − P + (1− δ)P )V
= (1− β)f 0PV = (1− β)f 0V = (1− β)W (37)
The second equality follows from (35), elementary manipulations lead to the third equality,
the fourth and the Þfth equality then use (36).
Also
W = f 0v = f 0u− f 0xω = f 0u− 1
2
ω = (1− β)
µ
W − 1
2
ω
1− β
¶
= (1− β)cW
where the second equality follows from the fact that v = u− xω, the third equality uses
the housing market equilibrium f 0x = 1
2
, and the fourth equality follows from (37).
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